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COMMENTS
FRENCH NUCLEAR TESTING: A CRISIS FOR
INTERNATIONAL LAW
PART I-THE LEGAL ARGUMENTS
On July 21, 1973, only one month after the International Court
of Justice had prohibited it,' France began a new series of atmos-
pheric nuclear tests in the South Pacific.2 The tests pose a continuing
threat of danger to the local population, their natural resourses, and
to the various nations near the test site. This possible violation of
international law, and the present inability of the world community
to stop or even postpone it, raises serious questions about the value
of available international mechanisms for solving conflict between
nations and preventing serious global environmental damage.
At the outset, two issues must be distinguished. The first is the
legality of the French extraterritorial atmospheric testing per se in
light of modern principles of international law. The second is the
specific French disegard of the World Court opinion which temporar-
ily prohibited the tests pending a ruling on their legality. Both issues
raise the possibility of serious, but separate, violations of interna-
tional law.
PACIFIC TESTING AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
The question of the legality of nuclear testing in the Pacific is
not a new one. It was first suggested in the mid 1950's that any
nuclear testing on the high seas might be in violation of international
law.3 At that time legal attention was focused exclusively upon the
United States testing in the Central Pacific. After the United States
discontinued atmospheric testing, the focus shifted to the French
Pacific tests begun in 1966.1
The French justification for its testing has always been fairly
simple. France has repeatedly argued that the question is strictly a
matter of security and self-defense: so long as other nations main-
tained a nuclear capability, France would continue to build hers. 5
1. Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v. France) conveniently found in 12 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 749 (1973).
2. N.Y. Times, July 22, 1973, at 1, col. 5.
3. Margolis, The Hydrogen Bomb Experiments and International Law, 64 YALE
L.J. 629 (1955).
4. FACTS ON FILE, DISARMAMENT AND NUCLEAR TESTS 1964-69, at 99 (V. Mastny ed.
1970) [hereinafter cited as FACTS ON FILE 1964-69].
5. UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL & SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS, THE
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The only alternative would be to continue to rely upon NATO defen-
ses and the U.S. "nuclear umbrella." The unacceptable danger of
that course is either being pulled into a nuclear confrontation not of
her own making, or at the other extreme, failing to receive the NATO
or U.S. nuclear support in a time of real crisis.' Thus a limited but
independent "force de frappe" is seen as the most viable kind of
nuclear defense. President de Gaulle consistently remarked on the
unacceptability of "relying for her defense and thereby her existence
and, finally, her policy, on a foreign protectorate and one that is
uncertain anyway;" he would emphatically protest: "No! We are
worth more than that!"'
But at the basis of all the French arguments supporting her
position is the compelling rationale of equity. France has purported
to be a proponent of complete and total disarmament, but, she rea-
sons, so long as some nations continue to possess atomic weapons, it
is hypocritical and unreasonable of them to expect that others will
not exert the same right.'
What makes France unique, however, is that she has no vast
open spaces of national territory available to conduct testing Test-
ing any kind of weapons on national territory has never been consid-
ered illegal per se. 1 With a dense population it is an absolute necess-
ity to go elsewhere. Thus the French development of nuclear weapons
is bound to interfere with others' rights, at least to some degree. What
those rights are and to what degree they are interfered with will
determine the status of the testing in international law and its seri-
ousness in terms of international peace and political stability.
France first began her testing in remote regions of the Sahara
Desert in 1960" over the strong protests of the North Africans and in
disregard of a U.N. General Assembly resolution, which requested her
UNITED NATIONS AND DISARMAMENT 1945-70, at 210 (1970) [hereinafter cited as UNITED
NATIONS AND DISARMAMENT]; B.G. BECHHOEFER, POSTWAR NEGOTIATIONS FOR ARMS
CONTROL 546-7 (1961); KESSING'S RESEARCH REPORT, DISARMAMENT: NEGOTIATIONS AND
TREATIES 1946-71, at 322 (1972); B. RUSSET & C. COOPER, ARMS CONTROL IN EUROPE:
PROPOSALS AND POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS 24-36 (1966-67).
6. D'Amato, Legal Aspects of the French Nuclear Tests, 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 66, 68-
69 (1967); W.B. WENTZ, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION 84 (1968).
7. FACTS ON FILE 1964-69, supra note 4.
8. WENTZ, supra note 6 at 93.
9. The Soviet Union, China and the United States each have sufficient territory
for most of their testing. The United Kingdom has conducted most of its tests jointly
with the United States.
10. Taubenfeld, Nuclear Testing and International Law, 16 Sw. L.J. 365, 381
(1962); G. SCHWARZENBERGER, THE LEGALITY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 51 (1958).
11. For a discussion of the legality of the Sahara tests, see Note, French Nuclear
Testing and International Law, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 144 (1969).
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to refrain from such testing in light of the test ban negotiations then
underway at Geneva.'2 The tests were widely condemned, but the
twenty-two predominantly Middle Eastern and African states were
unable to convince the General Assembly to meet in special session
to consider the question.'1
3
Not until four years later did pressure from the newly indepen-
dent North African states cause France to discontinue her Sahara
testing. " Forced to go elsewhere, France resumed testing in the South
Pacific in 1966 at the Mururoa Atoll, 750 miles southeast of Tahiti.'"
From then on, all French testing has been conducted atmospherically
at that location.
Compared to previous Pacific testing, the current French tests
have been fairly small, and the French are understandably angry at
the furor they have caused.' The first and most extensive testing in
the Pacific was conducted by the United States, beginning as early
as 1946'" and continuing sporadically until 1962. In 1952, Great Brit-
ain became the second to conduct tests in the Pacific off the coast of
Australia.' By far, the largest series of Pacific testing took place be-
tween April and November 1962 near Christmas and Johnson Islands
in the Central Pacific; thirty-five atmospheric tests, ranging from low
to high yields, were conducted by the United States."' These massive
and sometimes harmful tests drew little public protest. Nevertheless,
a great many events have occurred since the last non-French testing
in 1962 which cast great doubt on the legality and prudence of contin-
ued testing, and explain the current protests.
TEST BAN TREATY
The most important event has been the ten year success of the
Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in Atmosphere, In Outer
Space and Underwater (Test Ban Treaty).0 The treaty calls upon
each party to prohibit, prevent, and not carry out any nuclear explo-
sion in the atmosphere at any place under its control "including
12. G.A. Res. 1379, 14 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/4354 (1959). It
passed 51 to 16 with 15 abstentions.
13. UNITED NATIONS AND DISARMAMENT, supra note 5 at 211.
14. FACTS ON FILE 1964-69, supra note 4 at 40.
15. Id. at 99.
16. Fischer, Cronique de Desarmement, 1971 ANNUAIRE FRANCAIS DE Daorr
INTERNATIONAL 94 (1971).
17. Margolis, supra note 3 at 630.
18. KESSING's RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 5 at 5.
19. FACTS ON FILE, DISARMAMENT AND NUCLEAR TESTS 1960-63, at 89-90 (L.A. Sobel
ed. 1964).
20. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, In Outer Space
and Under Water, done Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S.
43.
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territorial waters or high seas."2 '
France is not a party to the treaty, and, therefore, argues that it
should not apply. Normally this would be accurate, but the Test Ban
Treaty may now be considered more than mere conventional law.
Two suggestions have been made that interpret the Treaty as binding
even upon non-signatories. The first is that the Treaty "may itself
have started, or at least acknowledged, a general rule of customary
International law' 2 2 which would prohibit any nation from conduct-
ing atmospheric nuclear tests. The second is that because of the
overwhelming acceptance of the Treaty2' it has become a peremptory
norm of international law (jus cogens) as recognized by Articles 53
and 64 of the Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties." Either inter-
pretation would cause any atmospheric nuclear testing to be a viola-
tion of international law.
Critics of these suggestions point out that two of the five nuclear
powers, France and China, have not signed or complied with the
Treaty or its principles, and therefore acceptance is not wide enough
to constitute either a customary rule or a peremptory norm.2 , On the
other hand, the overwhelming majority of states have ratified the
Treaty. More importantly, no nation has taken advantage of its unu-
sually simple withdrawal clause, and no signatory has violated the
treaty.
Traditionally, customary rules and general principles have de-
veloped slowly in international law. The law was created over the
course of decades and even centuries. But as international law be-
comes increasingly involved in regulating military, commercial and
scientific activities, its development must parallel the rapid develop-
ment of technology in those fields. Such crucial issues as the potential
dangers of radiation pollution will not wait decades to be resolved.
When there is imminent harm to the human race and to the world's
resources, the law must respond accordingly.
In light of the potential danger of nuclear testing to the human
race, and the overwhelming acceptance of and compliance with the
21. Id. at art. 1.
22. D'Amato, supra note 6 at 77. One author declares that "[qluite apart from
voluntary treaty-making such as the partial.Test Ban Treaty, it may be contended that
nuclear testing and the use of nuclear weapons are prohibited by customary interna-
tional law." Lee, International Legal Aspects of Pollution of the Atmosphere, 21 U.
TORONTO L.J. 201 (1971).
23. At least 93 nations have ratified, M. NORDQUIST, NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE LAW
OF THE SEA 829 (1973); at least 110 have either ratified or signed. EPSTEIN,
DISARMAMENT: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF EFFORT 19 (1971).
24. G. FISCHER, THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 10 (1971).
25. Mercer, International Law and the French Nuclear Weapons Tests, 1968
N.Z.L.J. 405, 420 (1968).
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Test Ban Treaty by states of every economic, social and political
persuasion, it is probable that the principles promoted by the Treaty
have become general principles of international law which apply to
all nations, whether signatories or not. When such unlikely pairs of
nations as the United States and the USSR, Israel and Egypt, Spain
and Sweden, South Africa and twenty-three Black African States26
ratify a treaty, it represents an exceptional agreement.
STOCKHOLM DECLARATION
While the Test Ban Treaty represents a specific prohibition on
testing, other instruments and activities raise more general principles
which are applicable to the French situation. The newest instrument
is the 1972 Declaration on the Human Environment (Stockholm Dec-
laration) ."
Principle 21 states that nations have the responsibility to ensure
that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause dam-
age to the environment of other states or of areas beyond the limits
of national jurisdiction. 2 The French claim that the damage caused
by their testing is minimal and that the sites used are better than any
used before because of their distance from population centers and
exposure to strong winds.29 Nevertheless, the French do not deny that
some damage will occur. The question then must focus on whether
the potential damage is so insignificant as to be de minimis or
whether it will be potentially so dangerous as to constitute a violation
of Principle 21.
The most significant fact about radiation is that the ultimate
long-term effects are simply unknown. It is known, however, that
radiation causes genetic effects in the form of gene mutations, chro-
mosome aberrations and changes in the number of chromosomes. :9 It
affects immune responses in many ways yet unknown to scientists.2 '
Leukemia is a radiation-induced malignancy which often appears
years after the exposure.2 It appears that lung, thyroid and breast
cancer are also induced by radiation. " A United Nations group vist-
ing Pacific islands in the vicinity of the United States' nuclear testing
in 1956 reported skin contamination, low white blood cell counts and
lowered resistance to diseases.
3'
26. NORDQUIST, supra note 23 at 824-29.
27. Declaration on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 48/14 (1972).
28. Id. at 7.
29. N.Y. Times, July 3, 1973, at 2, col. 4.
30. Report of the U.N. Scientific Committee on the Effects of Radiation, 27 U.N.
GAOR Supp. 25, at 10. U.N. Doc. A/8725 (1972).
31. Id. at 11.
32. Id. at 15.
33. Id.
34. 18 U.N. Trusteeship, Supp. 3, at 26-28, 45, U.N. Doc. T/1278 (1959).
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Even with extensive precautions by the United States, the crew
of the Japanese fishing boat, Fukuryu Maru, was exposed to radiation
eighty miles from the testing site. All on board were injured, five were
in danger, and one died from exposure .5 The United States implicitly
admitted its legal responsibility by agreeing to a negotiated $2 mil-
lion settlement for compensation to the victims. Damage from nu-
clear testing extends beyond direct exposure to humans. The 4000
pounds of fish on the Fukuryu Maru were dangerously contaminated,
and later, over 135 tons of fish were condemned in Japan.3' As a result
of the U.S. Pacific tests, the fishing grounds of the North West Pacific
"were gravely depleted."37
The French argue that their testing is more isolated and that
there is less exposure to the resources of the sea. Yet the Polynesian
Islands have a combined population of 90,000, with fish an important
staple item.31 How the testing will affect the genetic balance of mar-
ine organisms is unknown. Radiation could either retard the reprod-
uctive processes of marine life or contaminate the marine resources,
making them unfit for human consumption. In either case, the poten-
tial damage is severe.
Almost twenty years ago it was suggested that while there was a
duty of states under international law to prevent pollution of interna-
tional waters, in the absence of any international agreements or
decisions directly on point it was "as yet an inchoate one. ' '3 The duty
is no longer inchoate. The Stockholm Declaration and other agree-
ments have codified that duty. Its acceptance is unquestioned. The
French testing is not de minimis. Its dangers are potentially severe
and scientifically uncertain. Under these conditions, continued test-
ing must constitute a violation of international law under Principle
21.
Another principle of the Declaration applies even more directly.
Principle 26 calls for man to be "spared the effects of nuclear weapons
• . . and [for] destructon of such weapons."40 This principle was
originally introduced to ban nuclear weapons testing." Its expansion
into a call for general elimination of all weapons of mass destruction
does not lessen that original intent, as a ban on testing is implicitly
included in the elimination of nuclear weapons. Further, the prohib-
35. Margolis, supra note 3, at 637.
36. Id.
37. Mercer, supra note 25, at 407.
38. D'Amato, supra note 6, at 66, 73.
39. Margolis, supra note 3, at 643.
40. Declaration on the Human Environment, supra note 27, at 7.
41. Notes, The Stockholm Conference: A Step Toward Global Environmental
Cooperation and Involvement, 6 IND. L. REv. 267, 278 (1972).
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ited "effects" of nuclear weapons clearly include environmental dam-
age from their testing.
China and France were the only two nations voting against Prin-
ciple 26, and the French delegation announced that it would not be
bound by the recommendation." For France, the Stockholm Declara-
tion is not a binding convention. But it is certainly a highly important
example of the latest efforts of the world community to deal with the
environmental aspects of the nuclear testing problem. These princi-
ples, when viewed in context with some of the traditional arguments,
create a compelling case against the legality of the French testing.
FREEDOM OF THE SEAS
The past debate over the legality of Pacific testing has primarily
concerned the familiar principle of freedom of the seas. This debate
began with two now-classic articles written in 1955 concerning U.S.
testing in the Pacific. In one, Margolis challenged the legality of the
testing, 3 while in the other, McDougal and Schlei justified it.44 Their
respective arguments, having been analyzed and repeated exten-
sively,4" will only be summarized here.
Margolis argues that freedom of the high seas is essentially an
absolute freedom.4" The only exception is the status of contiguous
zones.4" The creation of any wide danger or warning areas in the high
seas is necessarily an interference with this freedom and not con-
doned by international law.
On the other hand, McDougal and Schlei argue that freedom of
the seas is "not absolute, and never has been."4" The law of the sea,
they contend, is a continuously changing set of competing norms.
One group of norms is a set of principles generally described as "free-
dom of the seas," which allows freedom of navigation, fishing and the
laying of cables. Another group of norms represent a variety of pre-
scriptive demands conflicting with absolute freedom of the seas,
among which are territorial waters, contiguous zones, customs zones,
security zones, national claims to continental shelves and fishing
42. Id.
43. Margolis, supra note 3 at 643.
44. McDougal & Schlei, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests in Perspective: Lawful Mea-
sures for Security, 64 YALE L.J. 648 (1955).
45. See generally D'Amato, supra note 6; Fliess, The Legality of Atmospheric
Nuclear Tests: A Critical View of International Law in the Cold War, 15 U. FLA. L.
REV. 21 (1962); McDougal, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests and the International Law of
the Sea, 49 AM. J. INT'L L. 356 (1955); Mercer, supra note 25; Taubenfeld, supra note
10; Note, supra note 11.
46. Margolis, supra note 3, at 634.
47. Id. at 635.
48. McDougal & Schlei, supra note 44, at 663.
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claims." The ultimate standard as to which prescriptions will be
honored is one of reasonableness. 50 There must be a balancing test
between the interference caused to basic freedoms of the sea and the
value of the interfering activity to the world community. If, on bal-
ance, the interference is reasonable, it should be allowed. The focus
of the McDougal-Schlei argument was that the overwhelming im-
portance to the "free world" of the U.S. testing, when balanced
against the relatively minimal interference with international trade
and commerce, clearly justified the testing under international law.
The U.S. testing represented the compelling norm of self defense at
a time when ". . . expectations of imminent violence in the world
arena . . .[were] more realistic and intense." 5'
This debate was echoed in the 1958 Geneva Conference on the
Law of the Sea and the subsequent literature. In terms of the current
series of French tests, however, it appears that a fair application of
the criteria proposed by either side of the debate would lead to the
same conclusion.
The clearest example of Freedom of the Seas is the 1958 Geneva
Convention on the High Seas (Geneva Convention).12 Article 2 states:
The high seas being open to all nations, no State may validly purport
to subject any part of them to its sovereignty. Freedom of the high seas
is exercised under the conditions laid down by these articles and by the
other rules of international law. It comprises, inter alia, both for coastal
and non-coastal States:
(1) Freedom of navigation;
(2) Freedom of fishing;
(3) Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines;
(4) Freedom to fly over the high seas.
These freedoms, and others which are recognized by the general princi-
ples of international law, shall be exercised by all States with reasonable
regard to the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of
the high seas.
The relation of Article 2 to the legality of nuclear testing was an
important point of discussion in the Second Committee of the Confer-
ence, which drafted it.53 To an extent, the debate reflected the classi-
cal argument between an absolute freedom and one explicitly based
on a standard of reasonableness, and to an extent, it reflected Cold
War politics.
49. Id. at 663-674.
50. Id. at 684.
51. McDougal, supra note 45, at 361.
52. Convention on the High Seas, done Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No.
5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205.
53. See generally Summary Record of the 2d Committee, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
13/40 (1958). Article 2 was debated as art. 27 in the draft articles and in this report.
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Poland first noted that the creation of nuclear danger zones cre-
ated de facto sovereignty which would be prohibited by the article.54
The entire Soviet bloc supported this interpretation as did Japan, 
5
India,'5 Tunisia,57 and Nepal.58 In the course of debate on Article 2,
another article was proposed which would have directly prohibited
nuclear testing on the high seas." Arguing against adoption, the
United States and Great Britain submitted that the subject of nu-
clear testing did not fall within the scope of the Conference, and
further that any applicable article must adopt a standard of
reasonableness.6 0 This article was never directly voted upon, however,
because the question was directed by the Conference to the General
Assembly for its consideration.
Nevertheless, it is interesting to note the position of the French
delegation on Article 2. France was one of the nations arguing most
strongly for the principle of absolute freedom of the seas. The delega-
tion suggested that "[e]xercise of the freedom of the high seas is
regulated by international law in order to ensure their use in the
interests of the entire international community."'" To this end, they
proposed language, adopted by the Conference, that in regard to the
high seas, "no State may validly purport to subject any part of them
to its sovereignty. 6 2 (Emphasis supplied.)
These debates were transpiring, of course, when only the United
States and United Kingdom were testing in the Pacific, two years
before France perfected her first nuclear device, and presumably, well
before France had an idea that events would force her to test in the
Pacific. In this regard, the French attitude on draft Article 48 (now
Article 25) is most interesting. Article 25 states:
3
1. Every State shall take measures to prevent pollution of the seas
from the dumping of radio-active waste, taking into account any stan-
dards and regulations which may be formulated by the competent inter-
national organizations.
2. All States shall co-operate with the competent international or-
ganizations in taking measures for the prevention of pollution of the seas
or air space above, resulting from any activities with radio-active materi-
als or other charmful agents.
54. Id. at 6.
55. Id. at 11.
56. Id. at 14.
57. Id. at 21.
58. Id. at 23.
59. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/L.30 (1958).
60. Summary Records, supra note 53, at 15.
61. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/C.2/L.6 (1958).
62. Id.
63. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 52, at art. 25.
1974
120 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY
It is often argued that this article had been drafted to control
only peaceful and commercial uses of atomic energy, as evidenced by
the term "dumping" of radioactive wastes which seems to narrow the
intent. Several states, however, have interpreted it as directly prohib-
iting testing of nuclear weapons on the high seas. 4 Its ambigious
language could possibly justify such a conclusion. But an amendment
which was proposed in the Second Committee by France would have
assured such an interpretation. The French wanted to broaden the
scope of the Article to cover any "contamination by radioactive sub-
stances," 5 as opposed to merely "dumping." The delegation sug-
gested that to put radioactive pollution " 'on the same footing as
pollution by oil,' was a mistake; there could be no doubt that pollu-
tion by radioactive substances was much more serious.""6 Had the
French proposal been adopted, the conventional restrictions on test-
ing on the high seas would have been stronger.
In short, before France had probably ever contemplated the need
to use the Pacific for nuclear testing and was, presumably, more
objective in outlook, she stood on the side of absolute freedom of the
seas and strict controls on radioactive pollution. France did not, how-
ever, ratify the High Seas Convention and does not consider herself
bound by it. The French position is now one close to the McDougal-
Schlei approach, but even this more restrictive approach cannot jus-
tify the French testing.
The two major elements of the McDougal justification of the
U.S. Pacific testing were the reasonableness of the tests, as reflected
by their "minimal" inteference with use of the high seas, and the
importance of the testing to the "free world."67 This basic test in-
volves a balance between infringement of basic rights and necessity
to the world community.
To many in the 1950's, the necessity of nuclear parity in that
bipolar political world was of paramount importance. For the "free
world," it was essentially a matter of preparing for self defense
"under conditions of high necessity and absence of alternatives.""6
This was a view held not only by the United States, but by an "over-
whelming" majority of nations.6
9
Clearly, in the 1970's, the French testing does not have such
support. Of the nations of the world, only China has been vocal in
64. Cf. remarks of the representative of Ceylon in Summary Records, supra note
53, at 14.
65. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/C.2/L.6 (1958).
66. Summary Records, supra note 53, at 85.
67. D'Amato, supra note 6, at 67-68.
68. McDougal, supra note 45, at 361.
69. D'Amato, supra note 6, at 68.
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its support of the French testing. The justifications for the testing
discussed earlier simply do not create a compelling argument of ne-
cessity. On the contrary, rather than adding to world security, the
French development of a nuclear capability is a definite threat to
world security. The tests themselves have become a serious source of
friction between the Pacific states concerned and France. Addition-
ally, the danger of a catastrophic nuclear accident is far greater in a
large multipolar system of nuclear nations.70 Most importantly, how-
ever, the French development of an independent nuclear arsenal
gives impetus and justification to other nations of a similar size or
position to create their own independent nuclear forces, either as a
perceived military necessity or as a symbol of prestige.
Applying the classic balancing test, the value to the
international ommunity of the French testing is at best nonexistent
and is more probably negative. One commentary has declared that
the "French bomb is as irrelevant to the world as Louis XVI was to
the France of 1789."' 1 Therefore, for the tests to be justified, their
infringement on the basic freedom of the seas must be negligible.
There is nothing negligible about the creation of a danger zone
in the middle of the high seas with a radius of 200 miles and a down
wind corridor of 500 miles.72 It is not certain to what extent navigation
was disrupted by the danger zone during the first tests, but at least
one vessel, the American schooner Fri, was boarded by the French
and the crew physically removed in international waters.73 Even this
minimal interference with free navigation in the high seas should be
enough to tip the scales against France. More importantly, however,
it is necessary to look at the potential cumulative effects. It has been
suggested that if the French tests are justified, similar testing could
then become virtually unlimited in the Pacific, thus causing an in-
fringement of major significance.
74
In short, on the basis of a strict interpretation of freedom of the
seas, France has without doubt violated international law. Even with
the less restrictive balancing test of reasonableness, however, France
seems to be outside the bounds of international law in conducting its
Pacific testing. The risks to the indigenous population and the re-
sources on which they rely simply does not justify the negligible value
of the testing to the world community. As Margolis stated concerning
the U.S. testing in the 1950's, "it seems eminently reasonable that
70. Id. at 70.
71. French Filth, FAR EASTERN ECON. REV., July 30, 1973, at 11.
72. N.Y. Times, July 10, 1973, at 2, col. 4.
73. N.Y. Times, July 23, 1973, at 1, col. 4.
74. D'Amato, supra note 6, at 76.
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. . . [those] who are undertaking to produce a weapon of such de-
structive power, are the people who should make the sacrifices which
may be necessary for perfecting it."
7 5
FRENCH DUTY UNDER ARTICLE 73
The potential dangers to the indigenous population raise the
question of French conduct under Article 73 of the United Nations
Charter. That article gives the following mandate:
Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibili-
ties for the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet at-
tained a full measure of self-government recognize the principle that the
interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount, and accept
as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost, within the
system of international peace and security established by the present
Charter, the well-being of the inhabitants..."
If Article 73 applies to the French administration of the Polyne-
sian Islands, France has clearly violated her "sacred trust" by placing
her own national interests ahead of the "paramount" interests of the
native population. France argues that Polynesia is not a trust terri-
tory within the meaning of Article 73, but is instead an overseas part
of France.
It has been persuasively argued that France is estopped from
raising this argument."' Section (e) of Article 73 requires all adminis-
tering governments to submit reports to the Secretary-General con-
cerning their territories. France did so in 1946 concerning "French
Establishments in Oceania. 7 7 At that time, the General Assembly,
arguably in reliance on the French and other nations' reports,'7 de-
clared that all territories, included in the reports submitted, were to
be considered the non-self-governing territories to which Article 73
would apply. If therefore, the French territories fall within the scope
of Article 73, it can reasonably be argued that France is in violation
of that portion of the U.N. Charter.
NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY-DISARMAMENT DECADE
Article I of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty) states that each nuclear-weapon
state should do nothing to "assist, encourage, or induce any non-
nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such
weapons or explosive devices. ' 79 It has already been noted that the
75. Margolis, supra note 3, at 647.
76. D'Amato, supra note 6, at 73.
77. Id. at 72.
78. Id.
79. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done July 1, 1968, 21
U.S.T. 483, T.I.A.S No. 6839.
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development of a nuclear capability by France may seriously encour-
age others to develop a similar capability for reasons of either defense
or prestige. It has been said that "France provides a model for several
nuclear club candidates.""' France is not a signatory to the Non-
Proliferation Treaty, but has promised to behave exactly as the con-
tracting states to the Treaty)" Thus while explicitly, but not legally,
accepting the principles of the Treaty, France is effectively violating
them.
This kind of indirect violation"' becomes more serious in light of
on-going global activities to limit or eliminate the nuclear arms race.
Since the 1950's, the U.N. General Assembly has passed over 20
resolutions calling for the end to all nuclear testing. Most impor-
tantly, it has declared "the Decade of the 1970s as a Disarmament
Decade."1'' : Indeed, the 1970's have seen some encouraging develop-
ments, such as the 1971 implementation of the Treaty on the Prohibi-
tion of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of
Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor," and the on
going Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) between the United
States and the Soviet Union." These kinds of activities have two
functions. First is to achieve practical, specific agreements to limit
arms or to introduce safety measures against accidents. Just as
importantly, they have served to create a global atmosphere condu-
cive to negotiations and to lessen tensions. This kind of atmosphere
is imperative for successful negotiations to reach meaningful disar-
mament measures. By their continued testing and development of
nuclear devices, both France and China place this healthy global
atmosphere in danger. They violate the overwhelmingly supported
spirit of the Disarmament Decade by flaunting the international
community and continuing their testing which is dangerous not only
to life and health, but to world peace and security.
VARIOUS OTHER PRINCIPLES
A variety of other possible violations of international law by the
French testing have been suggested or are apparent. A few will be
briefly mentioned.
80. WENTZ, supra note 6, at 86.
81. U.N. Doc. A/PV.1672 (Prov.) at 3, 6; also UNITED NATIONS AND DISARMAMENT,
supra note 5, at 294.
82. It has been suggested that France may be directly violating the treaty as well
by secretly providing support to an Israeli nuclear arms program. WENrz, supra note
6, at 110.
83. G.A. Res. 2602E, 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969).
84. Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other
Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor, done Dec. 7, 1970.
conveniently found in 10 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 145 (1971).
85. See generally KESSING'S RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 5, at 358-75.
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A. Poisoned Weapons
It has been argued that nuclear devices, with their resultant
radioactive fallout, should be classified as poisoned weapons within
the meaning of various international conventions8 including the
Hague Peace Conventions of 1899 and 1907 and the 1925 Geneva
Protocol on Poisonous Gases and Analagous Materials, which was
ratified by France.87 If thus classified, the use of nuclear weapons,
because of their contamination, would be prohibited, even in time of
war. But this prohibition on the use of poisonous materials would
"apply even more compellingly in time of peace to the incalculable
poisonous effects of nuclear tests upon innocent parties.""8
B. Trail Smelter
It has been suggested that the 1941 arbitration between Canada
and the United States (Trail Smelter Arbitration) is a valid preced-
ent in international law for environmental disputes.8 9 In this dispute,
the United States sought damages and an injunction against the
operation of a smelter just across the border in Canada. In finding for
the United States, the tribunal declared that:
no state has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a
manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or
the properties or persons therein, when the case is of serious consequences
and injury is established by clear and convincing evidence. 0
Certainly, by analogy, injury by radioactive wastes is as serious as
injury by fumes and is, thus, includable in the Trail Smelter princi-
ple. But the applicability of the principle has been challenged as
pertaining only to determining liability and compensation for dam-
ages and not a "prohibition of prospective harmful or illegal activ-
ity."9 Yet if Trail Smelter is to serve as a principle of international
law, it must be noted that remedies for environmental damage in-
cluded both damages and injunction. If therefore, injury has resulted
of "serious consequence" which is "established by clear and convinc-
ing evidence," the activity causing the injury should be stopped.
Wheneftie issue to which the principle is to be applied is narrowed to
just the current series of French testing, no serious injury has yet
resulted. If, however, the issue is broadened to include the legality
of all testing in the Pacific or at sea in general, the injuries caused
by the U.S. testing in the 1950's, causing at least one death and the
86. Fliess, supra note 45, at 26; SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 10, at 26-37.
87. C.J. COLOMBOS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 21 (6th ed. 1967).
88. Fliess, supra note 45,at 26.
89. Nanda, On Establishing Standards of International Environmental Injury 7
(not yet published); Lee, supra note 22, at 207.
90. Trail Smelter Arbitration, IAA at 1965-66.
91. Mercer, supra note 25, at 419.
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destruction of a large volume of fish, are of serious enough conse-
quence to justify a total prohibition against all future testing in the
Pacific.
C. Genocide Convention
It has been suggested that the 1948 Convention Against Genocide
may be violated by the French testing.12 The convention prohibits any
activity which may "destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical,
racial or religious group," in any number of ways including the caus-
ing of "serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group. 9 3 The
indigenous population of the South Pacific is, of course, exposed to
both serious physical and mental harm from the tests. But the Con-
vention is of limited application, because it requires that the activity
must be committed with the intent to destroy the group. No one can
seriously argue that France has any such intent.
CONCLUSIONS ON THE LEGALITY OF THE FRENCH TESTS
A wide variety of international legal principles, customs and con-
ventions have been discussed which bear on the matter. It has been
shown that the French Pacific testing, and probably any atmospheric
testing, is in clear violation of international law. An analysis of the
Test Ban Treaty, the Stockholm Declaration, the classic principle of
freedom of the seas, the test of reasonableness, the efforts of the
United Nations and its Charter, and a number of other principles and
activities provide the persuasive evidence.
In spite of their overwhelming condemnation by the interna-
tional community and their patent illegality under international law,
the tests continue. The available legal mechanisms have been in-
voked to no avail. The efforts of the international community to stop
these tests provide a disturbing case study of the inefficacy of current
procedures of enforcing international law and settling disputes.
PART II-RESOLVING THE CONFLICT
Article 33 of the United Nations Charter 4 suggests a variety of
peaceful methods for the settlement of disputes. The failure of these
methods (almost all have been attempted) to resolve the dispute over
French nuclear testing illustrates some of the weaknesses of the cur-
rent international system of conflict resolution.
EFFORTS TO USE THE UNITED NATIONS FORUM
The battle began in 1958 after France announced she would soon
92. D'Amato, supra note 6, at 76.
93. U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
94. "The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger
the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution
by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, re-
sort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice."
U.N. CHARTER art. 33, para. 1.
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be proceeding with her first tests in the African Sahara. Twenty-two
African and Middle Eastern states responded by introducing the first
successful General Assembly resolution against nuclear testing.1
5 It
was directed exclusively against France, spoke of the "dangers and
risks" of the Sahara testing, expressed its "grave concern" and
directly requested France "to refrain from such tests." 6 This United
Nations effort had no effect upon France. Neither have the more than
twenty resolutions which have followed over the years, most of which
have been directed at testing generally, and not at France in particu-
lar.
There have been two trends in these resultions. First is a notable
increase in concern about the urgency of stopping all testing. Sec-
ondly there has been a growing emphasis on the health and environ-
mental dangers of the testing and far less on the military danger. As
early as 1960, the General Assembly warned against the "hazards of
radiation resulting from test explosions as well as their adverse conse-
quences to the prospects of world peace." 7 A decade later, reflecting
the ecology movement, the General Assembly declared "with special
concern that the continuation of nuclear weapon tests in the atmos-
phere is a source of growing pollution."9
Beyond this, the discussion in the General Assembly has now
returned to the focal point where it began-opposition, almost exclu-
sively, to French testing. One of the primary forums of debate has
been the Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and
the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction. In 1971,
several Pacific nations used the Committee to call upon France to
cease atmospheric testing "in view, inter alia, of the possibility of
serious harm to the marine environment and to marine life." 99 The
next year these countries complained that the tests were a health
hazard without any compensating benefit to the victims. 09 Again
they called upon France to halt the testing. France responded that
nuclear tests had never been conducted under such strict controls
with regard to the prevention and monitoring of side effects and
claimed that there had been no appreciable pollution resulting from
them.'9 ' Further, France pointed out that it had regularly submitted
95. G.A. Res. 1379, 14 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/4354 (1959).
Adopted 51-16 with 15 abstentions.
96. Id.
97. G.A. Res. 1648, 16 U.N. GAOR Supp. 17, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/5100 (1962).
98. G.A. Res. 2828, 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. 29, at 33, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971).
99. 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. 21, at 246, U.N. Doc. A/AC.135/SC.III/L.4 & Add 1
(1970).
100. 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. 21, at 65 (1972).
101. Id. at 66.
VOL. 4:111
COMMENT
reports to the U.N. Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic
Radiation which, in the absence of any comment on them, has im-
plicitly confirmed their harmlessness. Finally, France claims that the
assertions of environmental damage have all been made with no em-
pirical evidence. 10 2 The only nation coming to France's defense in the
debates was China, who claimed that the prohibition of nuclear test-
ing would be precisely advantageous to the consolidation of the mo-
nopoly of the United States and Soviet Union over nuclear weap-
ons. 1
0 3
The debates within the United Nations resulted in a 1971 resolu-
tion which called for a halt to all atmospheric testing by August 5,
1973.10 The 1972 resolution, reaffirming this deadline, singled out the
French testing, thus capping a series of resolutions of which the origi-
nal had been directed against France. It did so by "[e]xpressing
serious concern that testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere has
continued in some parts of the world, including the Pacific area, in
disregard of that [Test Ban] Treaty and of world opinion.'
0 5
Nevertheless, it remained clear that France had no intention of
complying with this overwhelming global sentiment. In response, the
Prime Ministers of Australia and New Zealand issued strong declara-
tions that France "must bear full responsibility" for the decision to
continue testing. 10 Even stronger language was used by the foreign
ministers of the "downwind" countries of Bolivia, Chile, Colombia,
Ecuador and Peru.0 7 Throughout the first part of 1973, an exchange
of diplomatic notes took place between France and Australia which
were unsuccessful in modifying the French position.
USE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
It was as a final resort that Australia and New Zealand brought
their dispute with France to the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
in early May 1973.108 Their reluctance to do so earlier resulted from
two major factors. First there were serious jurisdictional problems
which posed certain difficulties. France has strongly argued that the
Court lacks jurisdiction and made it clear that it would not recognize
the Court's jurisdiction. Secondly, aside from the force of public opin-
ion and a sense of international responsibility, the only concrete
means of forcing compliance with an ICJ order or decision is through
102, Id.
103, Id.
104, G.A. Res. 2828, supra note 98 at 33.
105. G.A. Res. 2934, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at 17-19, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972).
106. U.N. Doc. A/8741, at 2 (1972).
107. U.N. Doc. A/8740, at 2 (1972).
108. Nuclear Tests Case, supra note 1, at 749.
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an action of the U.N. Security Council. 0 9 As a permanent member,
France can veto any Security Council action.
Nevertheless, these governments, believing that they had ex-
hausted all other possible avenues asked the World Court to deter-
mine if the French testing was a violation of international law and,
pending its decision, to issue an interim order under Article 41 of the
Statutes of the Court"'0 prohibiting the conduct of any further nuclear
testing. That the governments of Australia and New Zealand took the
petition with the utmost seriousness is demonstrated by their
appointment of the Chief Judge of the Australian Supreme Court as
ad hoc judge in the ICJ proceedings.
The Court's response to the petition indicates two important
lessons concerning its potential use as a forum for conflict resolution.
First, the Court can act relatively quickly, and with flexibility, when
the urgency of a situation so warrants. Secondly, the efficacy of the
Court's decision depends upon the true desire of each party to allow
the Court to resolve the dispute.
OPINION OF THE COURT
The initial petitions were filed on May 9, 1973." Public hearings
were held from May 21-25. An order for interim measures of protec-
tion pending a decision on the merits was issued on June 22. The
operative part of the order read:
"The governments of Australia [New Zealand] and France should each
of them ensure that no action of any kind is taken which might aggravate
or extend the dispute ... and, in particular, the French Government
should avoid nuclear tests causing the deposit of radio-active fall-out on
Australian [New Zealand] territory. ..- 2
The stickiest issue in the Court's 8-6 decision was that of juris-
diction. The question centered on what degree of certainty about its
own jurisdiction, if any, is necessary before the Court may issue a
binding order of interim protection. The majority held that evidence
which appears, prima facie, to constitute a basis on which "the juris-
diction of the Court might be found" [emphasis supplied] is suffi-
cient to justify interim measures of protection. The philosophy is that
when there is a possibility that the Court will hear the case, and there
is danger of immediate and irreparable injury to one of the parties,
it is both prudent and proper to order measures to avoid the injury.
This conclusion was also endorsed by at least one dissenting judge
109. U.N. CHARTER art. 94.
110. "The Court shall have the power to indicate, if it considers that circumstan-
ces so require, any provisional measures which ought to be taken to preserve the
respective rights of either party."




who, however, found no such prima facie evidence of jurisdiction., 3
The majority's decision on this issue seems to have a sound basis
in legal authority.' The question is not novel; it has been raised on
several occasions before the World Court."5 In 1951, the ICJ was first
confronted with a request for interim measures of protection in the
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Case."' The United Kingdom had
brought an action against Iran after nationalization of the Iranian oil
industry. Ultimately, Iran won when the Court announced that it did
not have jurisdiction. Before that decision, however, the Court had
issued an order calling for strong interim injunctive measures. In
issuing that order the Court ruled that when "it cannot be accepted
a priori that a claim . . . falls completely outside the scope of inter-
national jurisdiction," then measures of interim protection can be
issued without in any way determining the ultimate issue of compe-
tence to deal with the merits."7 When Iran failed to comply with the
preliminary order, Britain raised the matter in the U.N. Security
Council, requesting enforcement. The request became moot, how-
ever, when the Court announced shortly thereafter that it did not
have jurisdiction, causing the interim measures to collapse."'
When a request for interim measures of protection was raised in
1957 in the Interhandel Case,"9 the Court neatly avoided the issue of
jurisdiction by declaring that the good faith of the respondent
(United States) was sufficient protection. The question of jurisdiction
on the merits was ultimately avoided as well.29
The next cases raising the issue were the recent Icelandic Fisher-
ies Jurisdiction Cases. 2' This dispute evolved from British and West
German opposition to the establishment by Iceland of a 50 mile fish-
ing zone in 1972. Again a question of jurisdiction was involved, and
again prior to deciding upon that question, the Court entered an order
of interim measures of protection. Despite the rather clear compe-
tence of the ICJ based upon an exchange of notes in 1961 authorizing
it, Iceland simply refused to submit to the Court's jurisdiction. As a
113. Dissenting Opinion of Judge Petren in Nuclear Tests Case, supra note 1, at
765.
114. E. DUMBAULD, INTERIM MEASURES OF PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL
CONTOVERSIES 165, 186 (1933); S. ROSENNE, I THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL Cour 424 (1965).
115. For their early use by the Permanent Court of International Justice, see
DUMBALD, supra note 114, at 147-54.
116. [1952] I.C.J. 93.
117. P.J. LIACOURAS, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 61 (1962).
118. ROSENNE, supra note 114, at 156-59.
119. [1957] I.C.J. 105.
120. LL couRAS, supra note 117, at 209-10.
121. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, 12 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 743 (1973).
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result, the interim measures were highly unsuccessful. 22 A settlement
was finally agreed upon in late 1973 outside the forum of the World
Court and only after a potentially dangerous military standoff be-
tween the two countries.
23
Against this unhappy background, it is not surprising that the
attempt to impose interim injunctive measures in the nuclear testing
controversy was not successful. From the outset, France argued that
it was not subject to the Court's jurisdiction in the matter since it fell
into the scope of an express limitation to the 1966 French acceptance
of compulsory jurisdiction, specifically excluding "disputes concern-
ing activities connected with national defense.' ' 24 The petitioners
relied on Article 33 of the General Act of 1928 for the Pacific Settle-
ment of International Disputes to which France was a signatory.,?
That article called for compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent
Court of International Justice for certain disputes. On the possibility
that the 1928 Act had not been superseded by the 1966 declaration
or, in the alternative, the possibility that nuclear weapons testing
may not be included in the concept of "national defense," the major-
ity found that a prima facie case had been made that the Court might
have jurisdiction. 2 6 These fragile possibilities were enough to justify
issuing the Order, but not enough to convince France to accept the
Court's decision and act accordingly. Just one month after the Order
was issued France began its new test series.
The next step in the case is scheduled to be a decision on whether
the Court has competence to entertain the dispute. In light of the
French attitude toward the initial Court action, it would be easy to
label further proceedings as wasteful and fruitless. It may well be,
however, that despite the French intransigence, the use of the World
Court may still prove useful in changing their current policy.
IMPACT OF THE COURT OPINION UPON FRANCE
In evaluating these international maneuvers, it must be noted
that France is by no means solidly united on the issue of nuclear
testing. Widespread opposition to the current series of tests is evi-
dent; sentiment is especially strong among the influential French
clergy. 127
It appears that the attitude of the French elite on the issue is
122. In the year after the measures were ordered, the nets of 68 British trawlers
were cut, live shots fired by Icelandic gunboats, and 13 collisions occured between
Icelandic and English ships. N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1973, at 3, col. 5.
123. N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1973, at 8, col. 4.
124. I.C.J. YEARBOOK 1972-73, at 60.
125. Nuclear Tests Case, supra note 1, at 750.
126. Id. at 751.
127. N.Y. Times, July 18, 1973, at 1, col. 6.
VOL. 4: 111
COMMENT
sharply divided. In 1966, an in-depth series of interviews with a large
number of the French elite indicated considerable opposition to
maintenance of a nuclear "force de frappe." When asked if they
considered a national deterrent to be a prerequisite to a nation's
independence, over half said they did not.'2 When asked if they con-
sidered an independent deterrent necessary for a nation's prestige in
the world, only 29 percent responded that they did.' 29 Finally, by a
slim margin, the elite felt that the development of a nuclear capabil-
ity was not worth the cost.' 30 While these results may be slightly
outdated, there is little reason to believe that French attitudes have
hardened in the years since.
It is, then, upon French attitudes and politics that the ICJ ac-
tion, and the international response to it, may have the most influ-
ence. Global reactions have put the French on the defensive. Follow-
ing the Court order, the French Ambassador to the United States felt
compelled to reply in length to a New York Times editorial on the
subject. Setting the stage for a justification of the violation of the
Court order which was obviously to follow in a few days, Ambassador
Kosciusko-Morizet wrote that the other parties were "the first to set
themselves in contradiction with the court's request" through mea-
sures such as boycotts of French products and transportation, and the
cutting off of mail and telephone communication between the two
countries."'
From this kind of reaction, it is clear that the French are sensi-
tive to world public opinion. Their defiance of the Court order has
aroused a number of official diplomatic protests,'32 severe criticism
from legal scholars'" and scathing denunciation in various media.'1
4
This barrage of negative reaction is bound to have some influence on
French attitudes.
There is, among some scholars, a healthy trend to look beyond
the obvious frailties of the international adjudicatory system to a
more subtle, but highly important, role of international law in formu-
lating national policy. This role simply can be to "operate as a re-
straint by raising the political cost which a country pays for engaging
in certain conduct."' ' The Acting Legal Adviser to the U.S. Depart-
128. K. DEUTSCH, ARMS CONTROL AND EUROPEAN UNITY: ELIrE ATrITUDES AND THEIR
BACKGROUND IN FRANCE AND THE GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC 130 (1966).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. N.Y. Times, July 10, 1973, at 40, col. 4.
132. 12 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 749n. (1973).
133. Nanda, French A Tests Stir Storms of Protests, Rocky Mountain News, Nov.
25, 1973, Global News Section, at 1, col. 1.
134. See French Filth, supra note 71.
135. R. FISHER, INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT FOR BEGINNERS 174 (1969).
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ment of State recently noted that "the absence of a comprehensive
and dispositive system of adjudication does not necessarily lead to
international anarchy. States comply with law among other reasons
because it is politic to do So.'
'
136
It remains to be seen how much France will be influenced by
world opinion. A good deal depends upon the reaction of the French
people and the resolve of the government. Thus even though a contin-
ued deliberation of the issue in the World Court might be fruitless in
producing concrete compliance with any orders to discontinue test-
ing, its influence on world public opinion may be an important factor
in any French decision to discontinue testing. There is clearly some-
thing more sacrosanct about a World Court opinion than a General
Assembly resolution. Perhaps, the traditional independence of the
courts in many municipal systems, and the strong popular respect the
judiciary receives among the public, makes an ICJ decision have even
greater potential impact upon public opinion than upon the
development of concrete international law.
There is little room for compromise on this particular issue. "Ul-
timately the only alternatives are the continuance or the cessation of
the French nuclear tests in the Pacific."'' 7 Given this situation, the
various possible diplomatic procedures which have been suggested",
can provide little direct benefit since each are designed to facilitate
compromise. More attention has been focused upon the testing since
Australia and New Zealand went to the ICJ than any time previously.
A continued pursuit of this course of action may prove to be the best
one in the immediate future.
William K. Ris, Jr.
136. Brower, International Law as an Instrument of National Policy, 3 DENVER J.
INT'L L. & POLIcY 285 (1973).
137. Dissenting opinion of Judge Forster, Nuclear Tests Case, supra note 1, at 758.
138. See for example Note, supra note 11.
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